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FINANCINGPUBLIC WORKS IN PROSPERITY AND
DEPRESSION: THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PUBLIC WORKS AS A PROBLEM OF FEDERAL FINANCiNG
PUBLIC works undertaken by the Federal government dur-
ing the years 1920 to 1931 were financed from current rev-
enues: regularly recurring capital expenditures were han-
dled as part of the running expenses of the government.
Such a policy is feasible only in prosperous times. If public
construction is to be expanded or maintained at a high level
during depressions, when tax receipts are declining, financ-
ing must be accomplished mainly through governmental
borrowing.
Heavy increases in the national debt in periods of de-
pression, when budget is either already unbalanced or
threatened with a deficit, may be incurred in two ways: the
budget may be unbalanced still further through steady in-
crease on the expenditure side while revenues are declining,
or the debt for capital and emergency outlays may be set
apart in an extraordinary budget, with specified revenues
applied for its retirement, in recognition of the emergency
character of certain expenditures. Under either system, the
issue of large quantities of bonds vitally involves the entire
financial, monetary and banking structure of the nation, and,
in turn, the financial structure affects the terms upon which
funds can be borrowed. Frequently, a large borrowing pro-
gram cannot be put into effect because of certain monetary
restraints: first is the maintenance of the gold standard, with
the obligation to keep the currency at a par with that of
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foreign nations that are also on gold. If gold outflows occur
under such conditions the menace to the standard may
weaken government credit,and renderborrowing conditions
unfavorable. If the banks are in a precarious position, bor-
rowing must be cautious and may be difficult, since they are
the largest purchasers of government bonds. On the other
hand, the issue of government securitiesmayin affect
the general situation by providing a means of potential credit
expansion through their use as a basis of bank lending. More-
over, government securities have been in the past and are
now in still greater measure the basis for currency issues.
In the background there is always the danger that, if busi-
ness conditions fail to improve, the point may be reached
where the government resorts to currency issues in order to
pay for its depression program, either because the banks are
unable to absorb more bonds, or because tax revenues are
inadequate for debt service and operating costs. Central
banking policy itself may be guided by the general inten-
tions of the government with respect to the price of credit.
Finally, all these factors—the existence of depression, the
condition of the budget, the status of the gold standard, the
amount of actual and probable national debt, the possibility
of credit and currency expansion, and Federal Reserve policy
—appear as elements in the money market conditions that
the government faces when it sells bonds. Hence the cost,
the speed, and the magnitude of the program are ultimately
detenninedpart by the network of monetary and bank-
ing phenomena at any given time.
It is not possible to allocate the funds raised by the na-
tional government through borrowing according to the pur-
poses for which these funds are eventually expended. During
the recent depression the Federal government, incurring in-
creasing budget deficits because of declining revenues, re-
sorted to borrowing in order to finance not only expanded270 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
public works but also a variety of other expenditures. In
attempting, there[ore, to determine how public works were
financed during the depression, the government's money-
raising activities as a whole must be reviewed, and the fact
kept in mind that only a part of the funds were expended on
public works. For this reason, this chapter gives an historical
sketch of the financial and monetary events of the post-War
period which have had a bearing upon the decision of the
government during the depression to expand its public con-
struction work through the use of borrowed funds.
However, the relation betweenthe expanded Federal
public works program and its financing in the latter half of
1933 is quite close. In the fiscal year the ordinary
budget was supplemented by an emergency budget financed
by loans. In this new budget, public works were the second
largest item,' and in the estimated emergency budget for
1934—35 they were the largest single category of expendi-
tures. Moreover, considerable effort was exerted to have the
funds for national and local public works allotted and trans-
ferred as rapidly as possible, in any event before June 1935.
In view of these circumstances, it may be assumed that the
financing done after June 1933, when the act establishing
the Public Works Administration was passed, was influenced
largely by the public works program and was so regarded
in financial quarters.2
THE PUBLIC DEBT, 1920—34
Before the World War the outstanding debt of the Federal
government was approximately one billion dollars. As a result
'Some of the items ordinarily listed under individual departments in the
regular budget, e.g., naval construction, were shifted to the Emergency Public
Works program.
2Some authorities on public finance recommend the specification of the pur-
pose of bon4 issues for capital outlays by the Federal government, on ther aw— -.
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of the War, however, the total interest-bearing debt rose from
$1,023,000,000 on March 1917 to more than $26,000,000,000
L.atthe end of August 1919. After that date the debt declined
until 1931. Total retirements during the post-War decade ex-
ceeded $11,000,000,000, and in December 1930 the interest-bearing
debt was a little below $15000,000,000(see Table 79). Not only
had the debt itself been reduced but also its cost had been mate-
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Source: U. S. Treasury Reports
IFiguresas of end of fiscal year, June 30.
riallylessened by refunding and by the arrangements made for
the distribution of maturities to facilitate future payment from
current revenue. Funds for retiring the debt were obtained
chiefly from three sources: surplus revenue, receipts from foreign
governments, and the sinking fund. During the depression, how-
groundthat the maturitiescan then beadjusted to the life of the projects
concerned (see TheInternal Debts of the United States, byEvans Clarkand
Associates,p. 244).Thesettingup of an emergency budget would be a step
inthis direction.272 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
ever, redemptions from the sinking fund were offset by increased
borrowing, payments of principal and interest by foreign govern-
ments reduced, and the budgetary deficits created by decreased
tax receipts precluded appropriations for redemption from sur-
plus revenues.
In the first year of the depression, receipts from taxation were
greater than during several preceding fiscal years, reflecting the
high incomes earned in 1929.Receiptsfrom taxation for the fiscal
years 1.932andi933, however, dropped to approximately half of
the average annual tax revenues for the years 1922—30.Simultane-
ously with this curtailment of revenue, expenditures rose to War-
time levels.
By the end of the fiscal year 1933—34,thegains of the post-War
decade had been completely wiped out, the total debt at that date
exceeding $27,000,000,000.Thefluctuations in the total amount
of Federal debt oustanding during 1919—34areindicated in Table
79. According to the President's budgetary message to Congress
in January 1934,thepublic debt was to pass its War-time peak of
$26,000,000,000duringthe early part of 1934andreach a new
high of over $30,000,000,000byJuly i,1934. Theevents of the
first half of i however,showed that these forecasts overesti-
mated the rate at which the debt would increase. The Treasury's
budget deficit was less than one-half the estimated $7,000,000,000
atthe end of the fiscal year 1933—34. The picture of government
finances had changed largely because RFC and PWA expendi-
tures had fallen far below the estimated needs for the fiscal year
(see Ch. IV—V).
Though it is impossible, as remarked above, to segregate
public works items in such a way as to indicate what portion
of the new debt was incurred for these particular expendi-
tures, a rough estimate may be made of the extent to which
both regular public construction and the emergency under-
takings contributed to the increase in the debt during the
depression. In making such an estimate, it should first be
pointed out that deliberate 'deficit financing' was not under-FEDERAL FINANCING 273
taken until the emergency budget was set up in When,
therefore, borrowing operations are attributed in any meas-
ure to expanded public works programs prior to that time,
we cannot infer an intentional effort to finance public
works in this way, while carrying on other expenditures
from current revenues. It is, however, true that public works
expansion began in December 1930, through increased ap-
propriations for roadbuilding, and continued with additional
authorizations in several departments until the establishment
of the emergency program in It is also true that the
first budget deficit appeared in the fiscal year In view
of the size of these deficits in 1931 and the ensuing years it
is safe to assume that not only all emergency appropriations
for public works but also part of the regular public works
program of the government were borne by a portion of the
debt incurred to meet the deficit. Even if all emergency ex-
penditures—public works expansion, farm and bank aid, for
instance—were subtracted from the budget figure, the re-
mainder, regular government costs, could not have been
financed entirely from current revenues, and it is reasonable
to assume that in so far as the regular public works program
was continued, part of its cost was met by borrowing opera-
tions undertaken during this period. For example, in 1932
the total expenditures chargeable against ordinary receipts
were about $5,000,000,000, from which emergency items of
about $1,300,000,000 may be subtracted,4 leaving regular
items of about $3,700,000,000. Total ordinary receipts were
oriiy about $2,100,000,000, leaving a deficit on these regular
expenditures of about $1,500,000,000, so that about43 per
cent of these expenditures were borne by borrowing. Of the
See Ch. IV and IX for these emergency authorizations.
Emergency items subtracted are: RFC capitalization, and additional ex-
penditures for the Federal Farm Board, Federal Land Banks, accelerated public
works, and Agricultural Marketing Act operations.274 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
total public works expenditures fori 932,$556,000,000,
about $300,000,000 were of an emergency nature.5 If it may
be assumed that of the regular public works remaining,
$256,000,000, 43 per cent were borne by borrowing (the
same proportion as that of the total regular budget) itis
found that about $110,000,000 of the regular construction
program were so financed. If emergency public works ex-
penditures, totaling $300,000,000 as described above, are
added to this figure, a grand total of $410,000,000, or about
74 per cent of all public works in 1932, may be considered
to have been borne by borrowing. Similar proportions would
result from applying the same reasoning to the fiscal years
1931 and 1933, while in 1934 an even larger part of the pro-
gram was paid for from borrowed funds, through the intro-
duction of the policy of deliberate deficit financing. Al-
though these figures are subject to a margin of error, owing
to changes in budgetary methods, the omission of construc-
tion for national defense purposes, and the necessity of as-
suming that the figure representing the proportion of the
regular budget paid for from loans can be applied to the
departments concerned with public works, on the whole the
figures would be influenced upward rather than downward.
It is therefore evident that borrowing conditions were an
exceedingly important factor in the maintenance and expan-
sion of public works during the depression.
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT
Concurrently with the recent growth in the total amount
of the Federal debt a very marked change occurred in the
composition of the debt structure itself. From the beginning
of 1930 to the close of 1933 the public debt rose over $8,ooo,-
These figures are taken from the reports of the Federal Employment Stabili-
zation Board and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury (see
Ch. IV). They do not include public works expenditures for national defense.FEDERAL FINANCING
000,000, of which about 58 per cent was in the form of short-
term indebtedness. Table 8o indicates that by the end of
about one-third of the tojal debt
TABLE 8o




END OF -' TOTAL
MONTH BONDS TOTAL NOTES1 CERTIFICATES2BILLS2 DEBT
Dec. 1930 $12,112 $2,880 $1,561 $1,192 $127 $14,992
March 1933 14,230 6,430 3,352 2,261 817 20,660
Oct.1933 15,674 7,217 4,902 1,363 952 22,291
Dec. 15,569 7,511 4,880 1,628 1,003 23,080
Source: U. S. Treasury Reports
1 Term from two to five years.
2 Maturing one year or less from date of issue.
of short-term loans, whereas in December i 930 short-term
obligations comprised only about one-fourth of the total.6
As a rule, the government borrows on short term for two
reasons: in anticipation of receipts from taxes, and as a pre-
lude to the flotation of long-term bond issues into which
short-term indebtedness is eventually funded. In periods of
stress governments are likely to resort more assiduously to
temporary borrowing because conditions may not be favor-
able for the flotation of long-term issues. The general
business uncertainty associated with unsettled economic con-
ditions in such periods, and the need of raising large sums as
quickly and economically as possible, combine to make short-
term financing the more feasible method. During and im-
The large proportional increase in the amount of Treasury bills is explained
by the recent introduction of this type of obligation. The first offering of these
bills was announced December 9, i929, and since then further offerings have
been frequent. Unlike certificates of indebtedness, which are underwritten
by banks, these bills are competitively sold, as funds are needed, on a discount
basis, thereby effecting some economies for the Treasury in carrying charges
(e.g., interest paid to banks while government deposits are idle).276 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
mediately after the World War, for example, a very substan-
tial part of the total public debt consisted of securities of
short
Under normal circumstances this floating debt would be
gradually cut down by the Treasury while the existing long-
term debt would be refunded at lower rates whenever the
market for government securities made that possible. But
after the depression began recourse was again had to short-
term credit. The trend was, howevef, in the direction of
intermediate rather than very short-term financing,, on the
ground that the large amount of early maturities outstand-
ing made the issuance of securities of longer maturity, even
at somewhat higher rates, desirable. Although the refund-
ing of the long-term debt at lower rates of interest had to be
postponed, the Treasury was able to raise the necessary funds
without difficulty because of the ready marketability of short-
term issues. The rates at which these issues were sold from
time to time are discussed later; it may be noted here how-
ever that, generally speaking, the banks absorbed them
readily. Various factors contributed to this result, among
them the excess reserves in the banks accumulated as a result
of the earlier open market operations of the Federal Re-
serve banks and the undersupply of new private capital
issues of an investment rating satisfactory to the banks.
Short-time issues are not generally attractive to individual
investors, because the return from them is small, and it is
probable that financing of this sort could not have been
undertaken if the market, and more particularly the banks,
had not been in a position to absorb them. Hence a brief
description of the elements in the background of govern-
ment financing, mentioned above, follows. Among these are
Federal Reserve policy, the reaction of gold outflows on the
position of the government with respect to financing, and
'See War Borrowing, by Jacob H. Hollander.FEDERAL FINANCING 277
the increasing importance of banks as holders of Federal
securities.
BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL FINANCING, 1928—1934
FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY
The Federal Reserve system attempted at an early stage in
the depression to counteract deflationary influences by com-
ing to the support of the money market with an easier credit
supply. It repeated the attempt at intervals throughout the
depression.
Immediately after the stock market collapse of 1929 the Federal
Reserve banks began to lower their rediscount rates, which had
been 5 and 6 per cent. The New York Federal Reserve Bank pro-
gressively lowered its rate down to 1.5 per cent in May 1931; in
the other Reserve banks rates of 2.5 and 3 per cent prevailed
during the summer of 1931. Concurrently, the holdings of United
States bonds by the Federal Reserve system increased by $231,-
ooo,ooo between January 1, 1930 and September i6, 1931. The
effect of these purchases of bonds was to pour into the member
banks large quantities of funds, thus increasing their reserves.
On September 21, 1931, when England went off the gold standard
and gold began to flow out of the United States, the Reserve
banks made efforts to counteract the effects of the gold exodus on
government credit and on the market through the purchase of
still more bonds. As the volume of bills held and rediscounted
by the Reserve system increased, however, the rates were again
raised (the rate of the New York Bank was 3.5 per cent at the end
of 1931) and the operations of the system proved ineffectual.
In 1932 the system again attempted to stimulate revival, both
by lowering the rediscount rates and by extensive purchases of
government bonds. From the end of February until August 1,
1932 slightly more than $i,ioo,ooo,ooo worth of bonds were pur-
chased with the object of releasing credit to business through the
banks. But because this campaign coincided with the period of278 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
gold exports and a general declineconfidence among business
men, the effective demand for the credit thus made, available
failed to The result of this attempt to stimulate
recovery through open market was not to expand
credit but chiefly to increase non-member bank balances held by
member banks.9
In the autumn of 1932 the first 'bank holiday' was declared
(October 31.,1932 in.Nevada).This led to a further decline of
confidence in banks and to a general withdrawal of funds. In
mid-February 1933thesuspension in Michigan accelerated this
trend. Withdrawals of currency from banks increased at an alarm-
ing rate; for the weeks ending February 15andFebruary 21with-
drawals totaled $149,000,000and$134,000,000,respectively;
during the next week (ending March i)theywere $732,000,000;
andduring the week prior to the nation-wide bank holiday, $8i8,-
ooo,ooo were paid out, even though during two days of that week
the Reserve banks were closed. The drain of funds from New
York was so large that the New York Federal Reserve Bank was
compelled to borrow $2io,ooo,ooofrom other Reserve banks.
Had the Bank not closed its doors, it is likely that its reserve
would have been entirely depleted.
After banks were reopened in 1933,FederalReserve
policy, as such, became of secondary importance. With the
initiation of the recovery program all efforts were directed
towards stimulating the demand for credit by such means as
8Somebelieved that the bond buying campaign was of too short duration,
and if continued would have brought about the desired results(see,e.g.,
R. G. Hawtrey, Trade Depression and the Way Out).
Professor S. E. Harris, in an analysis of recovery measures during the depres..
sion (Monetary Policy and Recovery, Economic Forum, Fall, 1933),argues
further that the ineffectiveness of the open market operations of the Federal
Reserve system is to be attributed to the inadequacy of support afforded to
those banks which were in the greatest difficulties. The banks that were actually
helped to reduce their indebtedness and increase their reserves at the Federal
Reserve banks were either unable or unwilling to extend additional loans.
For these reasons, Professor Harris believes that the RFC, by directly aiding
those banks which were in straitened circumstances, was more effective in its
efforts.FEDERAL FINANCING 279
theNational Industrial Recovery and the Public Works Ad-
ministrations. The Federal Reserve system was utilized to
absorb Federal issues of securities necessary to carry out the
program. In August 1933 the Federal Reserve banks in-
creased their purchases of United States securities from $io,-
000,000 to $35,000,000 per week. The bond portfolios of the
twelve banks exceeded $2,400,000,000 in 1934, as indicated
in Table 8i. But excess reserves of member banks also con-
tinued to grow in the autumn of 1933andin 1934, reaching
TABLE 8i
TOTAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
HELD BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1929-1934
(in millions)
END OF
MONTR 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
January $202 $479 $6io $746 $1,763 $2,434
February 169 480 599 740 i,866 2.432
March 172 535 599 872 1838 2,447
April 163 530 598 1,228 1,837 2,431
May 143 528 598 1,549 1,890 2,430
June 216 591 668 1,784 1,998 2432
July 147 577 678 1,841 2,028 2,432
August 150 602 728 1,852 2,129 2,432
September 162 597 742 1,854 2,277 2,431
October 321 602 727 1,851 2,421 2,430
November 326 599 717 1,851 2432 2,430
December 511 729 817 1,855 2,437 2,430
Source: Federal Reserve Board
over $2,000,000,000 in January 1935. Thus the base available
for the expansion of credit by banks was constantly increased,
actual expansion depending on the success of governmental
measures directed towards the creation of effective demand.
GOLD OUTFLOWS
Through the first four years of the depression a consistent
effort was made to safeguard the gold standard. After England
left the gold base in the autumn of 1931, gold withdrawals from
abroad set in. During the succeeding six weeks, over $725,000,000280 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
worth of gold was exported or earmarked. On February 28, 1932,
Congresspassed the so-called Glass-Steagall Bill, permitting the
use of government bonds• held by Federal Reserve banks as
security for Federal Reserve notes so that the system could avail
itself of more than a billion dollars worth of gold, until then held
as reserve for Federal Reserve notes. At this time the theoretical
'free gold', that is, gold held by the Reserve banks over and above
the legal requirements for reserve purposes, had decreased to
approximately $420,000,000.Inthe spring of 1932asecond gold
drain set in, as a consequence of which the United States lost
$500,000,000worthof gold, chiefly in exports to France. Although
this second gold exodus was considerably smaller than the outflow
of the preceding autumn, it reached panic proportions in the first
weeks of June. By that time the theoretical 'free gold' as com-
puted on the pre-Glass-Steagall Bill standards had been reduced
to a negative quantity, and President Hoover later made public
the statement that the country had been within two weeks of
abandoning the gold standard. This movement of gold during
the period under survey may be observed from Table 82,which
shows the net gold imports by months, 1929—34.
Thelast gold drain occurred in February 1933,whenthe public
began to demand payment of deposits in gold and gold certifi-
cates. Withdrawal by foreigners of their balances caused capital
to leak out of the country. As a consequence of the domestic 'run'
on the Reserve banks and the strong tendency for liquid funds
to seek shelter abroad, the reserve ratio of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank fell below the customary minimum. In April an
embargo was placed on the export of gold, and the country went
off the gold standard.(In June, the 'gold clause' in monetary
obligations was abrogated. The Government's action was upheld
by the Supreme Court in February 1935.)Thefirst step towards
'persuasive inflation' under the new policy was taken in May,
when the Federal Reserve banks were directed to purchase $25,-
ooo,obo of government securities in the open market in order to
release this amount of cash. The dollar continued to dropthe
foreign exchanges through the autumn, and the price of gold
continued to rise. On October 25,gold-buyingoperations wereFEDERAL FINANCING 281
TABLE 82
NET GOLD IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES, 1929-1934
millions)
19291 19301 19311 19321 19332 19342
January $+47$+ 4$+ 3' $—73 $— 3
February +25 +6o + —91+ i8 +453
March +25 +55 + 26 —25 22 +237
April +23 +66 + 50 30 10 + 55
May +24 +23 + 50 —196 —21 + 34
June +3° +14 + 64 —206 —3 + 64
July +35 —20 + 20 — — 84 + 52
August +18 —20 + 58+ 6 —8o + 37
September+i8 +3 + 21 + 28 —57 —19
October +i8 +26 —338 + 21 —32 + 11
November —23 +35 + 89 + 22 — +121
December —64 +33 + 57 +10k —9 + 92
1Source:Federal Reserve Board.
'Source: U. S. Customs valuations. These figures bring up to date the Federal
Reserve data on net gold imports which were discontinued after December
1932. Customs valuations at the rate of a fine ounce, January 1933—
January 1934. Customs valuations at the rate of a fine ounce, after Feb-
ruary 1934. The price of gold fluctuated during the months shown, but
the U. S. Customs applied these two flat rates.
begun by the RFC, which bid for newly-mined domestic gold at
$31.16 an ounce. The outline of the Administration's future
monetary policy appeared in the President's message of January
15, 1934. The Gold Reserve Act signed January 30 was the out-
come: the country was placed on a gold bullion standard, with
a new gold content of the dollar placed at 59 per cent of the
former weight, subject to variation between 50 and 6o per cent.
Moreover, title to the entire stock of monetary gold in the United
States, including that held by the Federal Reserve system, was
vested in the government. The 'profit' accruing from the reduc-
tion of the gold content of the dollar went to the Treasury. Of
this profit $2,000,000,000 were set aside in a stabilization fund,
to be used in the effort to raise domestic prices in two ways: (i) by
control of the foreign exchange value of the currency so as to
render it conducive to the ends pursued by domestic price poli-
cies; (2) by investment and reinvestment in government securities
in order to stabilize the market value of outstanding obligations.282 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
The latter measure could constitute a new potential inflationary
influence of the first magnitude through increasing the reserves
of the commercial banks.
Thus the early part of the depression was characterized
on the monetary side by the effort to remain on the gold
standard, punctuated by losses of gold as a consequence of
the maintenance of a free gold market. During this period
the Federal Reserve banks attempted to offset deflationary
tendencies by buying government securities and thus trans-
ferring cash to the market. But commodity prices continued
to decline, and bank loans did not increase. After March
1933 the effort to remain on the gold standard and to sup-
port prices chiefly through open market operations was dis-
carded for the new monetary policy involving abandonment
of the gold standard so that domestic prices could be manipu-
lated without reference to a fixed foreign exchange parity,
continuance of open market operations in the direction of
credit expansion, devaluation of the currency, and the estab-
lishment of a fund to operate against counteracting influ-
ences that might continue the deflation.
PUBLIC DEBT HELD BY THE BANKS
Concurrently with the growth of the. total amount of out-
standing Federal debt, a continually increasing proportion
found its way into the banks.
While in 1929 all the banks of the country, including the
twelve Federal Reserve banks, held approximately one-quarter
of the outstanding Federal debt of $i6,ooo,ooo,ooo, in 1932 their
portfolios contained slightly over 44 per cent of the nearly $19,-
000,000,000 total.b0 By December1933 the member banks of
10The enhanced importance of United States government securities as bank
assets is probably underestimated by the above percentage, since many banks
include short-term government debt among dother securities held'.FEDERAL FINANCING 283
the Federal Reserve system (for which complete statistical data
are available) held $7,254,000,000ofUnited States government
securities, and on December 31,1934,$9,905,000,000.Othersecu-
rities at these dates amounted to $5,132,000,000and$5,227,000,-
000 respectively.In 1933and nearly half the outstanding
debt of the United States government was concentrated in the
twelve Federal Reserve banks and the member banks.
The prominence of the banks as investors in government
securities has several important implications for the borrow-
ing program of the Treasury in the recent past and at present.
Among these elements are (i)therelative ease with which
the national debt can be refunded eventually because hold-
ings are not scattered; (2)relianceon the banks as the chan-
nels for credit expansion; theeffect on the market for
municipal securities of any effort by the Federal government
to dispose of the local bonds it received for loans under the
PWA. The concentration of holdings in the Federal Reserve
system has a significance with respect to potential credit and
currency expansion, because of the legal provisions permit-
ting expansion on the basis of government bonds within the
system, which will be described in the last section of this
chapter.
The first element of importance, the concentration of holdings
as an aid to later refunding, does not require additional com-
ment here; it does, however, emphasize the fact that future gov-
ernment financing will be more closely interwoven with bank
policy than with that of the investing public at large.
The second question, that of the banks as channels for credit
expansion, involves theoretical issues which are discussed in
Chapter XIV. Certain related facts, however, may be touched
upon here.
Probably no branch of the national economy was more ad-
versely affected by the depression than the banking system. Bank
failures assumed such proportions that Federal intervention be-
U- --284 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
came necessary. The National Credit Corporation, created in
the autumn of 1931,andthe Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, organized in February 1932,wereset up to sustain the
banking structure by providing it with funds. Another salient
feature of the financial predicament of banks during the depres-
sion was the remarkable shrinkage in bank deposits. Only a
minor portion of the more than decline by the
middle of 1933 was due to liquidation. The main reason was the
general hesitancy of bankers and borrowers to create and assume
new commercial The banking mechanism was further
disorganized by the hoarding of currency which began in the
spring of 1931.Asa consequence of this manifestation of panic,
the volume of bank notes in circulation, which in 1930hadbeen
somewhat under $5,000,000,000,rose than $7,000,000,000
duringthe first quarter of '933.
In an effort to stem the tide of local moratoria resulting from
the demoralization of banking conditions, President Roosevelt
by executive order closed all banks for a brief period in March
1933, and when they were reopened immediate legislative action
was taken to regularize bank proceedings and to remedy certain
banking difficulties caused by the depression. The history of
banking difficulties during the depression is significant chiefly,
for present purposes, for the evidence it reflects of unhealthy
business conditions in general, and because it serves as a partial
explanation of the readiness of banks to turn to investment in
government securities when the extensive borrowing program
of the Roosevelt administration was launched. Even though mem-
ber banks had accumulated large deposits, or reserves, with the
Federal Reserve banks as an outcome of the open market opera-
tions already referred to, the general banking situation was such
that lending to private business, already in considerable measure
unfortunate for the banks, could not proceed; moreover, before
the banks could function further as supporters of government
credit, the entire banking structure needed revision—an end
TheInternal Debts of the United States, ed. by Evans Clark, Ch. 12.FEDERAL FINANCING 285
towards which steps were taken in the banking and monetary
legislation of the period.
A5 explained in Chapter XI, banks are dy
holders of municipal as well as Federal securities. The PWA
is permitted by law to sell the local bonds it has received in
return for loans, provided that the proceeds are applied to
the retirement of the debt incurred originally for the PWA
program. A large number of these bonds have been sold to
banks and investment bankers, who in turn have resold
many of them to insurance companies, private investors, etc.
To the extent that these bonds are sold to banks the propor-
tion of Federal debt held by the banks is reduced, while
municipal bonds are sent into the banks via the Federal
government rather than. directly, as in the past. The speed
with which this is accomplished is determined in large meas-
ure by the effects it has on the municipal bond market; the
danger existed that the situation might lead to a lowering of
municipal bond values because of the volume of Federal
holdings hanging over a depressed market. Cautious manip-
ulation of these sales, a necessary accompaniment of this type
of public works financing, was therefore practiced. The
municipal bond market, however, experienced a sharp rise
throughout 1934 which rendered the situation very different
from that existing at the inception of the public works pro-
gram in the summer of 1933.
FEDERAL BORROWING AND MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS,
1928—1934
The effects of successive conditions of stringency and ease
in the money market during 1928—34onthe cost of govern-
mental borrowing are reflected in the experiences of the
Federal government, to whose obligations alone those of
municipalities rank second in importance. The fluctuations
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in Federal security prices described in the following pages
should be read in the light of the foregoing discussion of
fiscal, monetary and banking events during the depression.
During the boom period, and especially in 1929, the cost of
government borrowing was relatively high, owing to the
preference for high-yield industrial stocks.
In March 1928 the Secretary of the Treasury had been able to
dispose of a nine months' issue of certificates of indebtedness for
$300,000,000at3.25percent, but fifteen months later, in June
1929,hewas obliged, in offering $400,000,000runningfor the
same period, to advance the rate—after several intermediate ad-
vances—to no less than 5.125percent. In September 1929the
Treasury Department, in making another offering of certificates
of indebtedness running nine months, fixed the rate of interest
at only 4.875 per cent. This .25percent reduction was insignifi-
cant, however, in view of the fact that in the interval between
June and September certificates had been exempted from the
normal Federal income tax, as well as from surtaxes, thus in-
creasing the desirability of the issue.
But after the stock market collapse in October 1929the
preference for the liquidity and safety of government securi-
ties introduced a definite tendency towards cheaper Federal
borrowing, and an issue of certificates was sold in December
at a coupon rate of 3.125percent. In 1930 these easy con-
ditions in the money market were further improved. The
lack of confidence in the securities of private corporations
resulting from the stock market collapse continued to en-
hance the marketability of government issues. The expand-
ing volume of idle funds, therefore, inevitably migrated to
United States securities, and interest rates fell accordingly.
In June an offering of $400,000,000ofcertificates running for
a year at the interest rate of 2.875 per cent met with enormous
success. Three months later, in September, an issue of $325,000,-FEDERAL
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ooo, again running for a year, was floated at 2.375percent. This
was the lowest rate ever fixed on an issue of certificates until that
time. In November the Treasury's operations were further facili-
tated by the announcement that the rate of interest required to
be paid on government deposits would be reduced on December
ifrom2 to 1.5percent. Since certificates of indebtedness were
usually absorbed by the banks, which would pay for them by
creating deposit accounts for the government, this reduction in
the deposit rate served as a special inducement to banks to pur-
chase government securities. In December an offering of $250,-
oooooo,running for one year at an interest rate of 1.875 per cent,
and an issue of $150,000,000,runningfor six months and bearing
1.75percent interest, were floated without difficulty.
As had been the case with municipal issues, in i931 inter-
est rates fell still lower.
In March a six months' issue of certificates in the amount of
$300,000,000carriedonly 1.5 per cent interest, and, a twelve
months' issue of $6oo,ooo,ooo, 2percent interest; a Treasury
bond offering of $500,000,000madeat the same time carried
3.375 per cent. The first of the above two issues of certificates was
only very lightly oversubscribed, but for the second the applica-
tions were double the amount offered.12 In April certificates for
$275,000,000,runningeight months, carried an interest rate of
1.875 per cent; subscriptions aggregated no less than $go8,688,ooo.
In June the subscriptions for an issue of $8oo,ooo,000 of Treasury
bonds bearing an interest rate of 3.125percent aggregated over
$6,ooo,ooo,ooo. Meanwhile the Treasury was selling from month
to month Treasury bills bearing no interest but offered on a
discount basis; by 1931thishad fallen to less than a one per cent
interest rate.
In the government's September financing, accomplished
12Oversubscriptionof bonds is not significant directly of the extent to which
the market is actually able to absorb an issue, owing to the practice of 'padding'
bids in order to ensure receiving the proportion of the issue that the bidder
desires. It does indicate some eagerness to receive a share of a government issue,
and its absence would be highly significant.288 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
before the gold outflows following the abandonment of the
gold standard by England, the Treasury managed to sell
an issue of long-term bonds at the rate that it had been anx-
ious to obtain for some years after the War. An issue of
$8oo,ooo,ooo 24-year Treasury bonds was sold at 3 per cent;
the sale was, however, only narrowly oversubscribed; $940,-
559,550 were offered and $803,294,400 were accepted. The
Treasury was more successful with a $300,000,000 issue of
1.5 per centi 2-month certificates, which was more than
three times oversubscribed. The advent of the European
crisis and the subsequent exodus of gold from the United
States were reflected in an immediate drop in the price of
American government securities. On September 29,1931
Treasury bonds went down to6/32. The depreciation of
government securities continued through part of October,
but the close of the month heralded more favorable con-
ditions.
The increasing discrimination of investors throughout
1932, on the other hand, enhanced the position of United
States gOvernment bonds. During that year the government
disposed of $8,213,198,000 in loans, of which $5,139,226,700
went to take up existing issues and $3,073,971,300 consti-
tuted new debt. The salient feature of this large financing
program was the steadily decreasing cost of borrowing.
On January 7, 1932 a $5o,i75.,000 issue of 91-day Treasury
bills was disposed of on a discount basis of 2.875 per cent, and on
June 25, $227,631,000 six-month certificates were floated at a cost
of 3.125 per cent. At the end of the year, however, on December
6, $254,364,500 of one-year certificates were sold at an interest
rate of 0.75 per cent, and $360,533,900 four-year Treasury notes
on a basis of 2.75 per cent. It will be remembered that at this
time the Treasury considered itadvisable to introduce inter-
mediate in place of very short-term credit, even though higher
rates of interest would have to be paid, on the ground that soundFEDERAL FINANCING 289
financing demanded a reduction of the floating debt as far as was
possible. Deliberate deficit financing had not yet become part of
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ury,to lighten the burden of short-term debt, was still being
pursued. After the first step towards conversion of the long-term
debt to a 3 per cent rate in September 1931,theTreasury aban-
doned its efforts along these lines. Not until June of was
another announcement made that a portion of the long-term
debt would be offered at this rate. Increasing business depression
and the change in financing policy with the advent of the new
administration prevented such operations in the interim.
During the bank holiday in March 1933 government bor-
rowing became much more costly. The banks, making des-
perate efforts to obtain cash, sold their short-term holdings
at a discount, thus depressing the market for these securities.
In March '933 the Treasury disposed of $469,131,000 of
5-month certificates of indebtedness carrying 4 per cent in-
terest, and $473,373,500 of g-month certificates carrying 4.25
per cent interest. The government had not had to pay as
much as 4 per cent on this type of security since the height
of the stock market boom in June—September 1929. This
stringency was, however, of short duration and Federal credit
soon recovered.
In June, $460,099,000 of 9-month certificates bearing only 0.75
per cent, and $623,441,800 of 5-year Treasury notes carrying only
2.875 per cent interest were easily sold. At the close of the follow-
ing month $353,865,000 2-year Treasury notes were disposed of
at a rate of 1.625 per cent, the lowest interest for notes to date.
Not only these two forms of intermediate debt, but also Treasury
bills, of short term, were sold on a low discount basis during
1933(exceptfor the period of the March crisis), and the increase
in this very short-term debt was very marked (see Table 80),
indicating the necessity for raising funds for the various emer-
gency purposes.290 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
Despite the tremendous financing operations of the Fed-
eral government the cost of borrowing continued to fall until
December 1933. The noticeable increase in interest rates
and discounts in that month was probably caused by the ex-
pectation of devaluation of the currency at an uncertain level
and by the large scale of Federal flotations—almost a billion
dollars of one-year Treasury certificates, part of the De-
cember quarterly financing, and $301,203,000 of bills sold on
a discount basis.
For the year the United States government floated obliga-
tions to the amount of $10,376,958,151, of which $7,354,621,-
700 were used for refunding purposes and $3,022,336,451
constituted new additions to public debt. The government
was thus responsible for the flotation of issues exceeding the
sum total of all capital issues of municipalities and private
business. An interesting aspect of the market in 1933 was the
heavy oversubscription of almost all issues. Financing in 1934
continued easy even after the President's budget message in
January, announcing a probable deficit in the budget of over
$7,000,000,000.
On January 24, 1934, $528,102,000 of 13.5-month Treasury
notes were allotted at a cost of 2.5 per cent. On February ig,
$418,292,000 of io-month, and $428,731,000 of 3-year Treasury
•notes were disposed of at 2.5 and 3 per cent, respectively. Another
issue of 4-year notes aggregating $455,175,000 was floated at a cost
of 3 per cent on March 15.
In summary, the Federal government borrowed to meet
its deficits, and later to meet huge emergency expenditures,
on the whole successfully, but not without difficulties at cer-
tain periods. The use of short-term debt was a normal out-
come of the period of stress. While the nation remained on
the gold standard its borrowing operations were complicated
by large gold outflows to settle foreign accounts. IncreasingFEDERAL FINANCING 291
relianceon banks as lenders not only facilitated short-term
borrowing, but also involved more and more direct connec-
tions between the national debt and general monetary con-
ditions. Finally, the financing was accomplished in the midst
of persistent downward trends in general business and credit
extension, in spite of open market operations, and with a
series of adjustments in the tax, budget and monetary struc-
tures which had an important bearing on Treasury policy.
During the months of 1933—34whenFederal financing was
in part motivated by deliberate intention to raise prices and
to stimulate business through the use of Federally-supported
public works, the market continued to absorb Federal securi-
ties readily. In general the credit of the Federal government,
measured by its ability to borrow at decreasing yields, im-
proved from the inception of the public works policy to date.
PUBLIC DEBT AS A MONETARY BASE
In addition to the purchase of government bonds from
banks as a means of releasing credit, several steps were taken
during the depression to make it possible for government
bonds to serve more effectively as a bank asset so as to estab-
lish a potential base for credit expansion.
In February 1932 the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Bill
authorized the substitution of bonds for gold as a reserve for
Federal Reserve notes over and above the required minimum of
40 per cent. In July 1932anamendment to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act extended the circulation privilege to all Unitfd
States bonds bearing an interest rate not in excess of per
cent. This measure added almost $3,000,000,000ofbonds to the
potential base of national bank notes.
The Emergency Banking Act of March further expanded
the credit base by permitting the issuance of Federal Reserve
notes on the basis of United States government securities or other
paper acceptable for rediscount. Under an amendment to the292 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
Agricultural Relief Act of May 1933(theso-called Thomas
amendment) the President was authorized to direct the Federal
Reserve banks to purchase $3,000,000,000worthof government
securities and to direct the Treasury to issue United States notes
up to
Despite the multiplicity of provisions very little use was
made of the opportunity to expand the existing amount of
currency. The national banks found it too costly to utilize
extensively the permission to increase their national bank
note circulation. The new type of Federal Reserve Bank notes
authorized by the Emergency Banking Act of 1933wasreally
never circulated. Moreover, the permissive powers of the
President to issue 'greenbacks' and to sell $3,000,000,000
worthof bonds to the Federal Reserve remained unexercised.
Only the provision of the Glass-Steagall Act allowing the
substitution of bonds for gold as a backing for Federal Reserve
notes was utilized during 1932torelease 'freeable gold' for
export purposes. This operation, however, lost most of its
significance after the suspension of the gold standard in the
spring of 1933.
Thetheoretical implications of the large issuance of gov-
ernment securities under the circumstances that attended the
program of 1933—34arediscussed in Chapter XIV. Here it
is sufficient to point out, in conclusion, the two main trends
in government financial policy during the depression period.
Efforts to supply the market with credit and to support prices
were at first made through lowering rediscount rates and
purchasing government securities in open market operations,
with the accompaniment, in 1932,ofdirect financial aid to
banks through RFC loans. These efforts were interrupted
from time to time by the assumption of new debt to meet the
increasing deficit. Until the advent of the Roosevelt adminis-
tration, Federal borrowing on a large scale in order to increase
government expenditures was impeded both by fear of injur-FEDERAL FINANCING 293
inggovernment credit and endangering the external value of
the dollar and by the belief that purchase of government
bonds by the banks might have the tendency to restrict in-
vestments which would otherwise have been made by private
enterprises. Finally, the policy of the present administration,
namely, to raise prices by monetary devices, by large expendi-
tures for public works and other purposes, and by other eco-
nomic measures, was attended by certain inflationaryossi-
bilities inherent in its borrowing program, in the sense that
through past and present legislation, as well as through the
large increase in the national debt, the opportunities to use
the debt as a basis for credit and currency expansion have
been greatly enhanced.